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H.: Trusts--Necessity of a Trust Res.
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
son's reputation in the eyes of a majority of people, but it is sufficient if he would be prejudiced in the opinion of a substantial
minority.-1 There can be little question but that P's reputation
would be prejudiced among a substantial minority of people who
disapprove of beer.
In further limiting the protection of public characters against
the use of their likenesses for commercial purposes, and in its conclusion that no injury was suffered by P, the decision is certainly
open to question.
E. I. E.

TRUSTS -

NECESITY OF A TRUST

Res. - Plaintiff contracted

with defendant to insure defendant's employees. Premiums were
to be collected pursuant to an arrangement whereby defendant by
bookkeeping entries was to deduct the premiums from each employee's wage, to credit the amount collected to the plaintiff's account, and subsequently to pay over this amount to plaintiff. Defendant became insolvent before it had paid over all sums which
had been credited to the plaintiff's account. Plaintiff claims
priority on the theory of a constructive trust. Judgment for defendant. Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to priority because
a trust res is necessary for the creation of a trust. Inter-Ocean
Casnalty Co. v. Leccony Svwkeless Fuel Co.'
Prior to the instant case there was some doubt in West Virginia as to the requirement of a res in the creation of a trust.2 In
Sullivau v. Madeleine Coal Go., 3 defendant maintained a burial
fund for its employees, and deducted a certain amount each month
from their wages to be paid into this fund. For a time these
amounts were deducted from the employees' wages and credited to
the fund, but not paid into the burial fund. In insolvency proceedings the court, in allowing priority as to the amount credited to
the fund, limited its discussion to whether the trust fund could be
traced. The court, in attempting to distinguish the Sullivan case
from the principal case, declares that in the former it was not concerned with the problem of whether a res existed, but decided
merely that the trust fund could be traced. The validity of this dis11 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTs (1939) § 559, comment e.
'17 S. E. (2d) 51 (W. Va. 1941).
2 See Note (1931) 31 CoL. L. REx. 800, 812, where it is said that "West Virginia does not strictly adhere to the doctrine that there must be a trust res."
3 115 W. Va. 115, 175 S. E.521 (1934).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1942

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [1942], Art. 17
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
tinction is doubtful, to say the least, since the problem of tracing
a trust fund logically requires assuming the existence of a trust. It
is difficult to see how one could trace that which did not exist. In
the Sullivan case, the court seems inadvertently to have overlooked
the question of finding a trust res and to have assumed that the
referee had found that a valid trust existed. The facts of that case
disclose little basis for any such finding. It is submitted that the
cases are indistinguishable and that the instant case squarely
opposes the implicit holding of the Sullivau case. At any event, the
court in the principal case, in following a recent United States
Supreme Court decision, 4 is clearly correct. Debiting the employees' accounts and crediting the account of plaintiff was merely
a shifting of credits and no res was segregated to which the trust
could attach.
P. W. H.
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claimant for
workmen's compensation was informed by the commissioner that
he could accept payments under the award already made and, if
proper showing be made, have his case reopened upon later application and be eligible for additional compensation. The commissioner failed or neglected to inform the claimant that acceptance of
the payments would constitute a waiver of his right to a hearing
on the present award, and would obligate him, on later application,
to show a progression or aggravation of his injuries which theretofore had not been considered. Held, one judge dissenting, that
acceptance of the payments by the claimant should not preclude him
from showing that the award was insufficient for his present
disability. Turner v. State Compensation Comm'r.'
The court conveniently states the principle governing its holding: "Time and time again this Court has held that the Commissioner may pursue such a course of conduct that he is estopped
to apply strictly the provisions of the workmen's compensation
statute." Cases in which this principle has been involved will be
considered in order to determine what course of conduct has been
held to estop the commissioner. In three similar cases,' decided
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4 McKee v. Paradise, 299 U. S. 119, 57 S. Ct. 124, 81 L. Ed. 75 (1936) ; Comment (1936) 43 W. VA. L. Q. 241.

117
S. E. (2d) 617 (W. Va. 1941).
2

Calloway v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 113 W. Va. 47, 166 S. E.
700 (1932); Yeager v. State Compensation Comm'r, 113 W. Va. 257, 167 S. E.
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